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Introduction 
In this article, my purpose is to try to explain the role and the 
importance of the philosophy and the sociology of law as it 
relates to constitutions, especially modern constitutions. 
As we all know, constitutions are the main jurisprudence and 
the main legislation of the state, which is at the top level of the 
codification system. In the hierarchy of legislation, constitu-
tions are the ‘roof’ of every legal system. 
Constitutions prescribe the general status of a state’s institu-
tions. Constitutions have also some worldview, some philoso-
phy that we might call ideology1
Philosophy and sociology of law study that ideology, that 
worldview, and try to establish an ideal system of law, an ideal 
constitution with regard to the nature of the human being
. 
2
What is human nature? Is it common for all of us? 
. 
Aristoteles (Aristotle) says: “human kind is a zoon politikon.” 
That means that we all are condemned to live in society. Our 
intelligence shows us that crucial fact. Animals also live in a 
society, but for them that fact is instinct; for us, our intelligence 
makes the discovery3
The difference between us and animals is that we have a de-
veloped intelligence but animals do not. 
. 
If that is the case, we should create rules to retain order in 
society, otherwise societies will perish and we will go out of 
existence.  
                                                   
1  ROBERT, Jacques et DUFFAR, Jean: Droits de l’homme et libertés 
fondamentales, Paris 2008, Montchrestien, pp. 7-21. 
2  IBID: 31-46. 
3  BRIMO, Albert: Les grands courants de la philosophie du droit et de 
l’état, Paris 1978, Pedone, p. 33-38. 
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In the societies there are four categories of rules: 
- Ethical rules; 
- Customs/mores; 
- Religious rules; 
- Law.4
Of course there are some interactions and bonds between 
these four categories of rules and a rule in one category can 
also take place in another. For example, burglary falls into all 
four categories. 
 
I will not explain the differences between these four kinds of 
rules; I will only focus on our subject, the concept of law. 
For some scholars law is the will of the state. If a person does 
not respect law, stringent punitive measures will force him or 
her to obey or face the consequences5
- What is the state? 
. At first glance, this 
definition of law is correct, but further examination leads to 
some questions: 
- Who gives to the state the right, authority, and power to 
rule people? 
- Should everything that the state suggests be law? 
- Is it incumbent upon the state to take into consideration 
the social and economical situation of the society before 
making the law6
- What is the role of justice in the process of making law? 
? 
                                                   
4  ARAL, Vecdi: Hukuk ve Hukuk Bilimi Üzerine (On Law and on Sci-
ence of Law), İstanbul 1979, pp. 70-84. 
5  IBID: 85. 
6  DOEHRING, Karl: Genel Devlet Kuramı (Genel Kamu Hukuku) 
(General Theory of State), translated by Ahmet Mumcu, İstanbul 
2002, p. 8, 10. 
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These questions and similar ones are the main problems of 
the philosophy of law7
Philosophy and the sociology of law are disciplines that try to 
understand the essence of the law. What do I mean by the 
essence? 
 though they should work in harmony 
with the sociology of law. 
Three elements contribute to the uniqueness of law versus 
other kinds of rules that exist in society: 
- The will of the state, as we mentioned before; 
- The social, historical, and economic factors; 
- The idea or concept of justice. 
So we can talk about the “three-dimensionality” of law. Let us 
focus on each dimension8
                                                   
7  IBID: Introduction by Ahmet Mumcu, p. VIII. 
. 
8  ÖKTEM, Niyazi, TÜRKBAĞ Ahmet Ulvi: Felsefe, Sosyoloji, Hukuk ve 
Devlet (Philosophy, Sociology, Law and State), Der Yayınevi, 
İstanbul 2011, pp. 59-63. 
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1. The idea or the concept of justice  
or the School of Natural Law 
The idea or concept of justice should be the founding principle 
of law. The two other elements are the secondary dimensions 
of the rule. 
That phrase, that proposition above, that justice should be the 
founding principle of law, is the main approach of the Natural 
Law School whose principles are the main pillars of modern 
western states. 
According to the Natural Law School (School of Jusnatu-
ralism), human beings come into this world with some rights 
that are irrevocable, inalienable, and absolute. The state, 
which is a creation of human kind, must recognize and guar-
antee these birthrights. The state is only an agent to organize 
the structure of social institutions, and oversee jurisprudence. 
It should not have plenipotentiary power over the people who 
create it. 
All natural rights are related to two main concepts: justice and 
freedom.  
1.1. Justice 
For jusnaturalists, like the ideas of ethics, truth, and aesthet-
ics, the idea of justice is a universal and eternal value of hu-
man existence. In the process of codifying law lawmakers 
should take into consideration the idea of justice. As with the 
application of the law, the ultimate aim of a judge should be 
justice. 
The concept of justice was given great consideration in early 
China. In his studies the great philosopher Kong Fu Zi (551-
479 B.C.) emphasizes the importance of the country’s justice 
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and ethical values. Retaining order in social and political life 
means to respect the idea of justice. Kong Fu Zi’s considera-
tions have become the main pillar of the Chinese jurispru-
dence system. 
The Greek philosophers, and especially Aristotle, widely de-
bated the concept of justice. Aristotle determined that there 
are three kind of justice: 
- Justitia distributiva; 
- Justitia commutativa; 
- Equitas9
Justitia distributiva envisages absolute equality for members 
of a country. No one has any kind of privilege vis à vis the 
other. Every citizen is equal before the law. However, let us 
not forget that, in Ancient Greece, the rights of slaves and 
women were not recognized, two positions that Aristotle sup-
ported. 
. 
Justitia commutativa gives more rights and opportunities to 
those who contribute more or gives more punishment to those 
who do more damage. For example, the citizen who earns 
more money should pay relatively more tax to the state, and 
the thief who steals more than once should be imprisoned 
longer than a thief with only one offense. 
Equitas. According to Aristotle, the main pillar of the justice 
system is Equitas. With that principle, judges should investi-
gate all the details of every case to find its core truth and 
should then rule with complete justice. For example, when a 
thief is brought before him, a judge should examine the thief’s 
psychology, his family situation, the situation that pushed him 
to the crime, etc., and then he should rule according to the 
extenuating circumstances. 
                                                   
9  For these concepts: IBID: 64-71. 
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Those three principles of justice still exist in the codifications of 
modern states. All modern constitutions have accepted the 
three perspectives of justice, including social justice. 
Social justice is a relatively new concept that appeared after 
the Industrial Revolution with the creation of a new working 
class. 
1.2. Freedom10
For the jusnaturalist, human beings have a free will. Man’s 
nature is free. We can talk about determinism, but that does 
not mean our life is a fatal victim of destiny. 
 
We also know that we are living in a universe that is not our 
creation. Water, fire, air, soil – the four basic elements, arche 
– were in existence long before humans came into the world. 
Now we are engaged in an adventure – we are on a stage to 
play a game that we should play with gentility. We should re-
spect the rules of the game and our acts should reflect the 
moral values of beauty, truth, and justice. 
As our intelligence is more developed than the one of animals, 
we know the difference between good and bad. 
This is human nature: we exist in a long running stage play 
and acting in that play is our great adventure.  
All legal systems should recognize and respect this human 
nature. It is the state’s duty to create a system for our natural 
rights. That means that the ultimate obligation of the state is to 
respect the human rights and to give all its citizens the oppor-
tunity to develop the conditions of his or her life, regardless of 
colour, race, religion, and beliefs, etc. 
                                                   
10  For the concept of freedom: ÖKTEM, Niyazi: Özgürlük Sorunu ve 
Hukuk (Problem of Freedom and Law), Istanbul 1977, İÜHF Yayını. 
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The duty of the constitution of modern states is to accept this 
obligation from the approach of the philosophy of law. 
But the problem is not that simple. We cannot omit the social 
factors that are the second dimension of law. 
Let us talk about the second dimension of law. 
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2. The Social and the Economic factors 
As Aristotle says, human kind is a zoon politikon. Thus, phi-
losophical analyses of law should emphasise its social aspect. 
If a lawmaker does not pay attention to the social, historical, or 
economic factors of his population, the codification of the laws 
he creates will not be successful. In comparison, we should 
consider the consequences if a doctor paid no mind to scien-
tific research in pharmacology, biology, physics, etc., when he 
works on curing a patient. 
Thus, in codification processes constitutions should reflect 
socioeconomic and historical data of societies. 
The scientific base of law is the sociology, economics, and 
history of societies. What the jusnaturalists say is only wishful 
thinking. Their ideology is not realistic. Law is a concrete is-
sue. You cannot analyze a concrete fact abstractly. Law is 
concrete and ideas like justice and values are abstract. So the 
methodology of the philosophy and the sociology of law must 
be positivism. The common denominator of different sociologi-
cal schools of law follows this argument but as different 
schools approach social factors, each one’s positivist para-
digm is different. 
How should we analyze the social dimension of law? What is 
our paradigm? 
For different sociologists, the social nature of law is different. 
Let’s briefly look at some of the different approaches: 
- Auguste Comte – Émile Durkheim – Leon Duguit – School 
of Solidarity; 
- Karl Marx and the Marxist Paradigm; 
- Historical School of Law; 
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- Utilitarian-Pragmatist School; 
- Montesquieu and the role of the geography and the cli-
mate; 
- Max Weber and the interaction between faith and econ-
omy; 
- Ibn Haldoun and the living conditions of sedentary or no-
madic people; 
- Georges Gurvich and the pluralism of the social factors. 
2.1. School of Solidarity 
Auguste Comte11
His ideological successor, Émile Durkheim
, the founding father of sociology and the 
word “positivism”, says: ‘Let us forget all kinds of abstract 
methodologies in the sciences. In both the natural sciences 
and the social sciences the only methodology is positivism. 
The abstract methodologies, like the theological and the 
metaphysical methodologies are not scientific and will never 
bring us the truth.’ 
12
According to Durkheim the origin of all kinds of social rules is 
based on the social nature of the human being. As we are 
zoon politikon, living in society is an inevitable part of our exis-
tence. The collapse of society is the end of humanity, so hu-
mans invent rules to retain their “togetherness” or solidarity. 
Like the other behavioural rules that grow from religion, ethics, 
and mores, for humans, the starting point and the purpose of 
, adopted this 
methodology to analyze law concretely. 
                                                   
11  COMTE, Auguste: Cours de philosophie positive, Paris 1938, 16e 
édition. 
12  DURKHEIM, Émile: Les règles de la méthode sociologique, Paris 
1976, 18e édition, Presse Universitaire de France. 
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law is to remain in solidarity with one another. The discourse 
of the jusnaturalists is not realistic, rather a wish for their own 
type of utopia. 
Nobody can deny the importance of solidarity for zoon 
politikon. However, is it legitimate enough to establish order? 
It seems that Durkheim is not that interested in the quality of 
law; solidarity is his greater concern.  
One of his disciples, Leon Duguit 13
When moral values come into play the concept of natural 
rights is inevitably a part of the codifications of constitutions. In 
other words, solidarity is all right, but a respect for human 
rights and moral values must be established as a foundation 
before codification.  
, uses universal law 
norms to sustain solidarity. For him universal law norms are 
the harvest, the heritage, and the culture of developed civiliza-
tions. He tries to accentuate the importance of the achieve-
ment of the human adventure through the centuries. We think 
he attributes some moral values to his concept of universal 
law norms. 
It is impossible to escape moral values if we want to create a 
liveable society with liveable solidarity.  
2.2. Karl Marx and the Marxist Paradigm14
One of the most influential sociologists of our time is Karl 
Marx. His contributions to the social sciences have opened 
 
                                                   
13  DUGUIT, Léon: L’État, le droit objectif et la loi positive, Première 
édition, Paris 1901. 
14  MARX, K.: Pages choisies pour une éthique socialiste, avec une 
introduction par M. Rubel, Paris 1948, Rivière. And: MARX, K. et 
ENGELS F.: Études philosophiques, Éditions sociales, Paris 1947. 
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new and important visions on the philosophy and sociology of 
law. The impact of his thoughts is still shaking the world.  
He is right to set the tone of history with the concept of the 
struggle between classes. He is also right in his analyses of 
history. 
Marx says that socio-economic factors directly determine the 
nature of social rules in society. The nature and character of 
the production system specifies the nature of the law and the 
other rules in a society. He is also partially right on other 
points. 
The Marxist school’s analysis of freedom is also very impor-
tant. This school says that the human beings are not free if 
they just accept destiny and do not do anything to understand 
social conditions and the consequences of natural determin-
ism. They are alienated, slaves, if they do not struggle to learn 
the human conditions. They become free when they start to 
change the human conditions of their society. This approach, 
this paradigm, is also excellent. 
Just like the solidarity school, the Marxist paradigm makes a 
mistake by excluding moral values from its analysis. Not con-
sidering an individual’s psychological situation is another mis-
take. Human psychology is not so simple that only socio-
economic conditions or the effects of cultural identity deter-
mine individual behaviour. The Marxist approach of psychol-
ogy is not very willing to recognize the importance of other 
factors in its psychology. 
In the end, we need to seriously consider the Marxist ap-
proach to the philosophy and the sociology of law, as it relates 
to the process of codifications and constitutions. Lawmakers 
should heed the working classes demands. As Marx says, 
exploiting the working class is not fair, so legal systems and 
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constitutions must establish class equality in their jurispru-
dence. 
When you talk about equality, it means that you recognize the 
concept of justice. When you discuss world justice, you come 
close to the natural law schools, to natural rights, and to hu-
man rights. 
It is impossible to escape moral values. 
2.3. Historical School of Law15
This school insists on including historical factors into law, fac-
tors that determine the traditions and customs of different na-
tions. For observers of this school, the concept of universal 
natural rights or natural law is not a realistic approach. Each 
nation has different traditions and these traditions determine 
law. The traditions and customs in China, for example, are 
different from those in Turkey or Europe, so the jurisprudence 
in these countries will differ. 
 
I accept that lawmakers should take the customs and tradi-
tions of each civilization into consideration, but human nature 
has some common features regardless of where human be-
ings live or to which civilization they belong. As the jusnatural-
ists say, justice and freedom are common features of human 
kind and all political regimes, all kinds of civilizations, all kinds 
of codifications should institutionalize the natural law endowed 
to each person. 
This historical school has been the official ideology of fascist 
and Nazi regimes worldwide throughout history. These re-
gimes want to prove that some nations deserve to be free and 
                                                   
15  COING, H.: Savigny et Collingwood, ou Histoire et Interprétation du 
Droit, Archives de Philosophie du Droit, 1959. And KANTOROWICZ: 
Savigny and the historical school of Law, L.Q.R., 1953, p. 334. 
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the others do not. Those who deserve should govern; those 
who do not are subject. Thus, the advanced civilizations, the 
advanced skilled minds must have more rights than the ordi-
nary people who do not deserve to be free. 
2.4. Pragmatist-Utilitarian School16
This school insists on the fact that humanity seeks for pleas-
ure. The main motivation of the human being is enjoying life. 
Consumption, sex, and other kinds of pleasures give happi-
ness. There are no common values, such as justice, ethics, 
and aesthetics, mentioned by the representatives of the jusna-
turalists. People are entitled to the good, the beautiful, the fair, 
and any and every event that gives them pleasure. But as 
each individual’s interest conflicts with someone else’s, society 
can see a real and concrete destruction. As Aristotle says, we 
are zoon politikon; if society perishes, so do we. 
 
Thus, we have created a state to maintain order and not to 
perish. States create laws to establish a balance for each indi-
vidual’s pleasures and interests to exist in relative harmony. 
That is the duty of the state. 
This is of course an interesting approach in the philosophy and 
the sociology of law. But the creation of order necessitates a 
judiciary and an equitable law system. Without it, people will 
complain about unjustness and they will not be happy. Thus, 
the Pragmatist-Utilitarian School’s aim will come to nothing. 
Again, the concept of the freedom, justice, human rights, ac-
cording to the jusnaturalists, should be the main pillars of the 
state, otherwise the collapse of civilizations is inevitable. 
                                                   
16  DAVIDSON: Political Thought in England. The Utilitarians from  
Bentham to Mill, 1915. 
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2.5. Montesquieu17
The eighteenth century French philosopher insists on the im-
portance of geography and climate upon the social life of peo-
ple. Montesquieu says that the essence of human nature is 
the most consistent element of codifications. Man is a living 
creature. He eats, he or she has a sex life, and he lives in a 
society in the form of a family. Another very important aspect 
of the human nature is the believing on moral values. 
 
According to him, human nature can also have different char-
acteristics depending on living conditions, geographic condi-
tions, and climate. For instance, according to him, people liv-
ing in hot climates are mostly lazy, and the intelligence of the 
people who live in cold temperature is much more developed 
than of the others. 
Lawmakers should take into primary consideration the effect of 
social life on human nature and, secondarily, the effect of 
geographical conditions on human nature. Without these con-
siderations, argues Montesquieu, we cannot talk legitimately 
of jurisprudence and constitutions. 
Montesquieu’s approach is completely correct. You cannot 
avoid the human nature in the legislation. 
He insists also on the importance of moral values. Nobody can 
deny the existence of the concept of justice and the ethics in 
life and in society. Thus, Montesquieu is coming very close to 
the philosophy of the jusnaturalists, because he is taking in 
consideration the importance of the moral values as an essen-
tial element of the human nature. 
                                                   
17  CHEVALIER, Jean-Jacques: Les Grandes Œuvres Politiques de 
Machiavel à nos Jours, Armand Colin, Paris 1950, pp. 100-141. 
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2.6. Max Weber18
The nineteenth century German sociologist insists on the irra-
tional aspect of the social life. According to Weber, people 
prefer to organize their lives irrationally. They need a life cen-
tred on legends and beliefs. In addition, the believing in relig-
ion orients the human being and is the most important part of 
social existence.  
 
Thus, the lawmaker should not forget the importance of relig-
ion as one of the most constructive elements of social life. He 
should not neglect it because it is irrational and because it is 
not scientific. 
On the other hand, there is an interaction between religion, 
beliefs, and the economy. The codifications and constitutions 
must understand the influence of that important social fact and 
should organize jurisprudence according to the role and the 
influence of that knowledge even though it is irrational. 
2.7. Georges Gurvitch19
The twentieth Century Russian born French sociologist ex-
pounds upon the importance of all the different factors men-
tioned above. We should analyze social life with a pluralistic 
approach, says Gurvitch, and the lawmakers should harmo-
nize all social factors, national and international, to make con-
stitutions: history, geography, local and international moral 
 
                                                   
18  WEBER, Max: Économie et Société, Paris 1971, Plond. And  
WEBER, Max: L’éthique protestante et l’esprit du capitalisme, 
1ère édition, 1904. 
19  GURVITCH, Georges: Libertés humaines et déterminismes sociaux, 
Paris 1955. And: GURVITCH, Georges: Sociology of Law, Kegan-
Paul Co. Ltd., London 1947. 
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values, mores of the international relations, the economy etc., 
etc. 
But very often, some sociological events and social conditions 
could have detrimental effects. Lawmakers need to be very 
careful here. While making legislation and constitutions they 
should take measures to cure ill effects. 
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Conclusion 
For most of jurists, the most important and clear difference 
between other categories of social rules and law is that the 
jurisprudence is the act of the state, and in the other rules, the 
state does not have any role. In a specific social rule, if the will 
of the state does not appear we cannot talk about law. 
That statement is true. The will of the state is one of the three 
elements of law. At the end, law is the will of the state20
States can declare their will according to the perception of the 
rulers. However, if the norms are not the fruit of a scientific 
process of analysis of socio-economic life, the legitimacy of 
law is called into question. If law does not prescribe justice, if it 
does not promote human rights according to the perception of 
the modern state’s concepts, legitimacy will always be an is-
sue worth discussing. 
. But 
we cannot consider every decision of the state as law. Law 
must be an achievement of a scientific process. 
The rulers can correctly obey the law in a specific state, but 
they may not act arbitrarily or use the norm exactly. In that 
specific case we can talk about the concept of rule of law, but 
not the legitimacy. That means that when the state applies law 
correctly, we can talk about the concept of rule of law. But if 
that state does not respect the concept of human rights and 
the nature of the human kind, such as freedom of expression, 
we can discuss the legitimacy of the constitution and all kinds 
of codifications in that specific state. Legitimacy necessitates 
freedom, respect of human rights, justice, and a taking into 
consideration of the data of socio-economic factors. 
                                                   
20  For the concept of the will of the state: BOBBIO, Norberto: Sur le 
Positivisme juridique, Archives de Philosophie du Droit, Tome I, 
Paris 1961, Dalloz. Also BRİMO: 271-321. 
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In his article, the author asks how legitimacy of law and the
concept of rules of law can be described taking into account
the interaction between aspects of philosophy and sociology
as well as the will of the state in states' constitutions. As the rule of
law, versus other kinds of rules in our society, should be regarded as
a rule of "three-dimensionality" – an interaction between the will
of the state, the social, historical, and economic factors, and the
idea or concept of justice –, the author focuses his interest on the
examination of these three factors always taking into account that
law is the will of the state, but that not every decision of the state
can be considered as law.
